Fathers in Office, Sons in Jobs: Intergenerational Returns to Local Political Office

Yu Qiu

University of Pittsburgh

NEUDC 2026
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Motivation


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- Politicians could influence hiring in both the public and private sector, generating advantages for their family members.(Fafchamps & Labonne, 2017; Folke et al., 2017; Gagliarducci & Manacorda, 2020)




JP Morgan Chase to pay $264m over Chinese 'princelings' bribery scheme

Settlement with US regulators follows three-year corruption investigation

Bank hired children of Chinese

Inside Elections

The 'Nepo Babies' of the House of Representatives


Inside Elections

The 'Nepo Babies' of the Senate


Asia Pacific

A family affair: can Asia break free from the power of its political dynasties?

Anger is rising at Indonesia's new administration - while Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Laos and Brunei are all led by the children of former leaders

Motivation

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- **Do these advantages persist long after politicians leave office?**
  - Particularly when officeholding is relatively brief, as in many ordinary local offices.

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- **How do merit-based institutions shape these advantages?**

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- **Do these advantages persist long after politicians leave office?**
  - Particularly when officeholding is relatively brief, as in many ordinary local offices.
- **How do merit-based institutions shape these advantages?**
- This paper: studies how parents' entry into local office affects adult children's long-run labor-market outcomes, and how civil service reform shapes the effect.

This paper

- **Setting:** 2,000+ township, village, and city governments in Ohio, 1912-1929
  - Elected and key appointed positions: Township trustees and treasurers; village and city mayors, council members, judges, fiscal officers, etc.
  - Variation in adoption time of municipal civil-service systems.

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


- **Main findings:**
  - Holding local political offices could generate *persistent* occupational gains for officials' adult sons, through both increased access to public and private-sector white-collar employment.
  - Meritocratic reform in the public sector did not eliminate intergenerational political advantage; it shifted the benefits toward the private sector.

Who Holds Local Office?


- Most positions are elected; median tenure is two terms.
- Average entry age is 47, and officials are overwhelmingly male. Summary Statistics
- Not concentrated among economic elites.

Distribution of pre-office occupational income rank



Research Design: Matched DiD

- **Sample**: Adult children aged 18-65 in each census & at least 18 in the first pre-office census ($t = -1$).
- **Timing**:




- Match each official's child to similar non-official child(ren) based on their own demographic chars, occupational income, and fathers' demographic chars and occupational income at $t = -1$.
  - Balance in targeted and non-targeted variables. ▸ Balance Table
  - Balance in $t = -2$ occupational income. ▸ Raw Comparison in Trends
- DiD in matched sample with individual, age-bin-at-year, year, and county FEs, SE clustered at the father level. ▸ Specification

Main Results

Father's Entry into Office ↑ Sons' Occupational Income

Occscore: median occupation income, in hundreds of 1950 dollars




Balanced panel | Inference | Outcomes

Drop county | Specification | Hetero:govt | Hetero:position

- **Wage income in 1940:** officials' sons earn ≈13% more than matched counterparts. earning

Father's Entry into Office ↑ Sons' Occupational Income


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Balanced panel | Inference | Outcomes

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- **Wage income in 1940:** officials' sons earn ≈13% more than matched counterparts. earning
- Upgrading: ↑ entry to white-collar occupations.



Addressing Selection into Local Politics

Concern: The estimated effect may reflect unobserved political ambition or family networks, rather than the effect of officeholding itself.


Entry Time: 1918 vs. 1922 Officials

Election Cutoff: Last Elected vs. First Unelected


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


Election Cutoff: Last Elected vs. First Unelected



▸ Data source

Limited Effects on Daughters' Labor-Market Outcomes



Son-in-law | Marital


- **Low baseline attachment:** female labor-force participation was around 22.4% in the 1920 Census.
- On average, no effect on daughters' labor-force participation or occupational income score. LFP
- Among working daughters, there is suggestive evidence of occupational gains. Working


Mechanism

Mechanism 1: Preferential Access to Public-Sector Jobs

- Sons of officials might be more likely to get jobs in the public sector through direct appointment, political recommendation, etc. Example

Public-sector employment





DAYTON, (


MAYOR APPOINTS SON CHIEF CLERK

John Haas and Stenographer Orrendorf Out of Jobs—Haas Chief Clerk For Past Eight Years.


Mechanism 1: Preferential Access to Public-Sector Jobs

- Sons of officials might be more likely to get jobs in the public sector through direct appointment, political recommendation, etc. ▸ Example
- The effect is concentrated in local governments. ▸ Table ▸ Heterogeneity

Public-sector employment




Effect by Government



Mechanism 2: Better Access to Private-Sector White-Collar Jobs

- Local governments interact with firms through licensing, zoning, procurement, etc. Table Zoning

Private-sector white-collar employment




Other mechanism


Mechanism 2: Better Access to Private-Sector White-Collar Jobs

- Local governments interact with firms through licensing, zoning, procurement, etc. ▸ Table ▸ Zoning
- Effect concentrated in wholesale, retail trade, finance, insurance, and real estate sectors.

Private-sector white-collar employment



Effect by Sector




▸ Other mechanism

Civil Service Reform and Intergenerational Political Advantage


Does Civil Service Adoption Limit Intergenerational Advantage?

- Starting in the 1880s, municipalities began adopting civil service reforms to promote a merit-based public sector (Kuipers & Sahn, 2023).
- *"notice of the time and place and general scope of every examination . . . once each week for two weeks preceding such examination, in at least two daily newspapers of opposite politics published in such city."* – Ohio 75th General Assembly
- These reforms increased the cost of discretionary public-sector hiring.
- I use staggered civil service adoption across cities in a DDD design to compare returns to officeholding for fathers entering before vs. under civil service. DDD specification

Civil service adoption in Ohio municipalities




Civil Service Adoption and Intergenerational Advantage



- Meritocratic reform in the public sector did not eliminate the intergenerational political advantage.
- Private white-collar gains are larger under civil service.

▸ Table

Civil Service Changes Where Political Advantage Appears



Conclusion

- **Holding relatively modest local political office for a short period could generate persistent gains for adult children's labor market outcomes.**
  - Through both better access to public-sector and white-collar private-sector jobs.
- **Merit-based hiring institutions can constrain where preferential access occurs, but may redirect rather than eliminate the returns to political connections.**
- **Suggestive evidence on the broader cost of intergenerational political advantages in small localities.** Downstream

Thank you!

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Appendix Slides

Example Page of Rosters

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
ASHTABULA, ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO.

Government—Council City Manager Plan. Population—22,082.

Office.	Name of Officer.	Politics.	Term Expires.
Mayor and President of Council	Frank L. Garner	R	Dec. 31, 1929.
Clerk of Council	J. H. Shaw	....	Dec. 31, 1929.
Members of Council	Ned Richards	R	Dec. 31, 1929.
	Arthur Rinto	R	Dec. 31, 1929.
	Nick Corrado	R	Dec. 31, 1929.
	A. H. Pontius	R	Dec. 31, 1929.
	Dr. R. J. Goggin	R	Dec. 31, 1929.
	William Rainnie	R	Dec. 31, 1929.
City Manager	J. E. Breen	....	Pleasure of Council.
Auditor	J. H. Shaw	....	Pleasure of Council.
Treasurer	E. H. Burrill	....	Pleasure of Council.
Solicitor	H. M. Nazor	....	Pleasure of Council.
Municipal Judge	Hugh Hewitt	....	Dec. 31, 1929.
Chief of Fire Department	J. E. Breen	....	
Chief of Police	A. J. Kane	....	Indefinite
City Engineer	C. R. Stanhope	....	Pleasure of Council.
Health Commissioner	Dr. A. J. Pardee	....	Pleasure of Council.
Board of Education	C. H. Bartram	....	Dec. 31, 1929.
	Viola Deuress	....	Dec. 31, 1929.
	M. G. Peck	....	Dec. 31, 1931.
	William Clifford	....	Dec. 31, 1931.
	Alden Hopkins	....	Dec. 31, 1931.
Board of Library Trustees (Not under City Control.)	Mrs. L. T. Carlisle	....	
	Mrs. M. G. Peck	....	
	Mrs. Mary Morrison	....	
	D. L. Davis	....	
	B. B. Seymour	....	
	Fred Williams	....	
	M. S. Mitchell	....	
Trustees of Sinking Fund	Thomas Cheney	....	
	J. L. Burwell	....	
	Chas. Tyler	....	
	C. A. Corbin	....	

Example Page of Voting Result

Back



The Vote Cast in Bucyrus at the Municipal Election

ELECTION --- TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1915

Office

Candidate names

Total votes

Office Filled	MAYOR			TREAS.		SOLICITOR		COUNCIL FIRST WARD		COUNCIL SECOND WARD		COUNCIL THIRD WARD		COUNCIL FOURTH WARD		BOARD OF EDUCATION								
Candidates and Voting Precincts R.—Republican D.—Democrat S.—Socialist	Harry Hoselton—R.	E. J. Songer—D.	W. G. Spiegel—S.	John J. Quaintance—R.	Victor M. Wegley—D.	J. Walter Wright—R.	Clarence U. Ahl—D.	C. R. Hove—R.	Charles Kline—D.	B. F. Lauck—R.	S. H. Coulter—D.	G. W. Grant—R.	Solomon Mantyeck—D.	A. G. Stolte—R.	E. W. Rinker—D.	E. G. Reid—R.	Col. G. W. Fisher—R.	C. A. Lingenfelter—R.	O. A. Bertram—D.	Will A. Smith—D.	A. E. McFadden—D.	H. C. Ehrick—S.	Victor Nussbaum—S.	
FIRST WARD—A	118	171	19	132	135	122	153	91	142	....	....	....	....	....	....	216	125	100	143	151	190	59	68	
FIRST WARD—B	111	153	16	211	110	107	146	89	147	....	....	....	....	....	....	193	81	91	96	85	330	40	65	
SECOND WARD—A	189	156	9	216	101	159	171	....	....	133	155	....	....	....	....	273	105	128	95	125	200	59	46	
SECOND WARD—B	125	114	2	155	61	155	88	....	....	91	124	....	....	....	....	246	127	93	85	169	188	37	23	
THIRD WARD—A	99	115	5	108	65	106	180	....	....	....	....	104	97	....	....	146	97	74	108	119	146	33	31	
THIRD WARD—B	139	172	15	183	100	176	129	....	....	....	....	138	150	....	....	271	130	155	169	152	187	71	59	
FOURTH WARD—A	60	127	6	80	100	77	191	....	....	....	....	....	....	56	115	120	59	59	129	97	112	30	17	
FOURTH WARD—B	110	172	3	151	102	123	112	....	....	....	....	....	....	125	126	206	118	117	127	122	128	26	41	
FOURTH WARD—C	40	21	....	33	17	32	15	....	....	....	....	....	....	21	25	94	13	13	23	25	18	3	4	
BUCYRUS SCHOOL DISTRICT	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	46	9	4	6	6	9	4	1	
TOTAL VOTE	991	1201	73	1191	805	1067	1013	180	289	224	279	242	247	202	269	1737	919	784	976	994	1335	367	356	
PLURALITIES	....	....	....	386	....	54	....	....	109	....	55	....	5	....	67	761	....	....	....	18	359	....	....	

Descriptive Statistics of Local Officials in Ohio

	All Mean	*City* Mean	*Village* Mean	*Township* Mean
Panel A: Local officials				
Male	0.936	0.926	0.925	0.950
White	0.985	0.984	0.982	0.988
Age first in office	46.702	46.937	45.792	47.597
Foreign born	0.034	0.055	0.036	0.025
Immigrant parents	0.213	0.290	0.212	0.193
Literate	0.984	0.986	0.981	0.987
Pre-office occscore	21.569	31.757	23.664	16.507
Pre-office public sector	0.022	0.069	0.021	0.010
Obs	57,936	6,634	26,288	25,014
Panel B: Population (Census 1920)				
Male	0.513	0.511	0.493	0.524
White	0.967	0.957	0.978	0.987
Age	29.224	28.418	31.686	28.927
Foreign born	0.119	0.194	0.050	0.051
Immigrant parents	0.332	0.488	0.187	0.177
Literate	0.971	0.963	0.980	0.976
Occscore	13.803	15.820	13.555	9.384
Public sector	0.007	0.010	0.007	0.003
Obs	5,763,198	1,764,029	505,897	1,452,462

Back

Research Design: Matched DiD

Back

- Nearest Neighbor Matching at $t = -1$: Match each child of an official to non-official child(ren) with the smallest Mahalanobis distance in the targeted demographic and family characteristics.


	Children of Officials		Matched Individuals		Difference Treated - Control	
	(1) Mean	(2) Obs	(3) Mean	(4) Obs	(5) Diff	(6) SE
Targeted variables						
Male	0.519	21,257	0.520	31,780	-0.000	0.005
White	0.998	21,257	0.998	31,780	-0.000	0.001
Foreignborn	0.002	21,257	0.002	31,780	0.000	0.001
Immigrant Parent	0.070	21,257	0.069	31,780	0.001	0.004
Literate	0.996	21,257	0.996	31,780	0.000	0.001
Age	24.941	21,257	24.901	31,780	0.039	0.072
Occscore	12.178	21,257	12.153	31,780	0.025	0.133
Father Literate	0.992	21,257	0.992	31,780	0.000	0.001
Father Occscore	22.186	21,257	21.978	31,780	0.208	0.162
Father Age	54.270	21,257	54.348	31,780	-0.078	0.101
Non-targeted variables						
Married	0.460	21,257	0.458	31,780	0.002	0.005
Num of Kids	0.656	21,257	0.674	31,780	-0.018	0.013
Mother Literate	0.992	19,893	0.985	29,176	0.007***	0.002
Mother Occscore	0.454	19,893	0.393	29,176	0.060	0.045
Mother Age	50.467	19,893	50.329	29,176	0.138	0.107

Raw Comparison


Back

- Sample: Children who were in the labor force before their fathers began holding office.





(a) Sons' occscore



(b) Daughters' occscore

Research Design: Matched DiD

Back

$$y_{ibct} = \alpha_i + \sum_{k \neq -1} \beta_1^k (\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times 1\{t = k\}) + \sum_k \beta_2^k 1\{t = k\} + \theta_{bt} + \mu_c + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{ibct}$$

$$y_{ibct} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 (\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}) + \beta_2 \text{Post}_{it} + \theta_{bt} + \mu_c + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{ibct}$$


- i denotes individual; j father of i; b age bin; c county; and t census year.
- $y_{i(jbc)t}$: occupational income score, job category etc.
- $\text{Office}_{j(i)}$: $= 1$ if i's father j ever enters local office (absorbing state); $= 0$ for their matched counterparts.
- Event time dummies $1\{t = k\}$ mark each census relative to father's office entry time ($k = -2, -1, 1, 2, 3$). Matched controls are assigned the event time of their treated counterpart.
- α_i individual FEs; θ_{bt} age bin at year FEs; and μ_c FEs; and γ_t census year FEs.
- SE clustered at the father level.

Intergenerational impact on sons' labor market outcomes

Back


	Labor-Market Outcome$_{it}$		Occupation Category$_{it}$				Earning$_{1940}$
	(1) Log Occscore	(2) Log Occscore	(3) White collar	(4) Skilled blue collar	(5) Low skill	(6) Agricultural	(7) Log wage income
Office$_{j(i)}$ × Post$_{it}$	0.027***	0.023***	0.020***	-0.008*	-0.000	-0.007	
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	
Office$_{j(i)}$	0.005						0.129***
	(0.007)						(0.023)
Individual FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Pair FE							Y
Control Mean	22.133	22.133	0.209	0.142	0.385	0.257	1287.692
R^2	0.160	0.715	0.686	0.575	0.544	0.638	0.610
Observations	81981	81981	84173	84173	84173	84173	11176

Heterogeneity of the Effect by Government




Back

Heterogeneity of the Effect by Office



Back

Balanced Sample



Back

Robustness: Alternative Inference

	Clustering at the level of			
	(1) Father	(2) Individual	(3) Matched pair	(4) County
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	0.0229^{***}	0.0229^{***}	0.0229^{***}	0.0229^{***}
	(0.0062)	(0.0060)	(0.0062)	(0.0056)
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Mean	22.133	22.133	22.133	22.133
R^2	0.715	0.715	0.715	0.715
Observations	81981	81981	81981	81981

Back

Robustness: Alternative Measures of Outcome and Specification

	IPUMS Occscore$_{it}$		LIDO Score$_{it}$		PPML	
	(1) Log	(2) Level	(3) Log	(4) Level	(5) IPUMS	(6) LIDO
Office$_{j(i)}$ × Post$_{it}$	0.023***	0.922***	0.023***	0.614***	0.040***	0.027***
	(0.006)	(0.172)	(0.006)	(0.163)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean	22.881	21.084	22.237	21.385	21.159	21.751
R^2	0.719	0.610	0.677	0.596		
Observations	81981	89690	73306	76363	89690	76363

Back

Robustness: Alternative Sample

	(1) Balanced Panel	(2) Office 1914-1920	(3) Office 1920-1928
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	0.022^{**}	0.022^{***}	0.027^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Mean	22.921	22.624	23.075
R^2	0.715	0.712	0.719
Observations	20351	49928	49555


Back

Robustness: Alternative FE Specificationn

	(1) logoccscore	(2) logoccscore	(3) logoccscore
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	0.0229***	0.0195***	0.0188***
	(0.0062)	(0.0061)	(0.0053)
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y		
Year FE	Y		
County-by-Year FE		Y	
Pair-by-Year FE			Y
Control Mean	22.133	22.133	22.133
R^2	0.715	0.717	0.888
Observations	81981	81981	81981

Back


Robustness: Dropping One County at a Time



Back


Intergenerational impact on daughters' LFP

Back



Intergenerational impact on working daughters' occupational outcomes

Back




Intergenerational impact on daughters' marital outcomes

Back

	Marital: Husband			
	(1) White collar	(2) Public sector	(3) Log Occscore	(4) Log Father Occscore
$Office_{j(i)} \times Post_{it}$	0.009	-0.002	0.071	-0.066
	(0.063)	(0.004)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pair FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Mean	0.144	0.001	20.085	17.539
R^2	0.580	0.582	0.630	0.602
Observations	9855	9855	9663	9395

Intergenerational impact on son-in-law's occupational outcomes

Back



Impact on Public-Sector Employment

Back

	Aggregate	Category			
	(1) Public sector	(2) Postal service	(3) Local government	(4) State government	(5) Federal government
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	0.0115^{***}	0.0067^{***}	0.0041^{***}	0.0003	0.0008
	(0.0022)	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0003)	(0.0007)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Mean	0.0173	0.0068	0.0081	0.0003	0.0020
R^2	0.5083	0.5767	0.4149	0.3043	0.3641
Observations	88251	88251	88251	88251	88251


Heterogeneity in Public-Sector Employment

Back

	Dependent variable: Public-sector employment				
	Government Format			Pre-office Occscore	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	City	Village	Township	Low income	High income
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	0.0029	0.0095***	0.0141***	0.0126***	0.0070
	(0.0092)	(0.0036)	(0.0029)	(0.0023)	(0.0066)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Mean	0.0220	0.0196	0.0156	0.0140	0.0362
R^2	0.5135	0.5186	0.5036	0.4855	0.5525
Observations	5684	31900	50667	70387	14377

Evidence on Direct Appointment in Government

Back



DAYTON,

MAYOR APPOINTS SON CHIEF CLERK

John Haas and Stenographer Orrendorf Out of Jobs—Haas Chief Clerk For Past Eight Years.

Example: Zoning in Euclid, Ohio

Back EUCLID v. AMBLER CO.

- In 1922, the Council in Euclid village adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance regulating: residential uses, commercial activity, industrial activity, and building height and density.

- The zoning ordinance hinders Ambler Realty industrial development and land values.

- In *Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.* (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the municipality's general zoning authority.
  - The Court recognized that zoning could "divert a flow of industrial development" from where it would otherwise occur.

Impact on Private-Sector White-Collar Employment

Back

	Aggregate	Government Format		
	(1) Private sector	(2) City	(3) Village	(4) Township
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	0.0159^{***}	0.0581^{**}	0.0225^{**}	0.0054
	(0.0054)	(0.0249)	(0.0094)	(0.0065)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Mean	0.1887	0.3745	0.2375	0.1429
R^2	0.6361	0.6167	0.6312	0.6269
Observations	88251	5684	31900	50667

Other Potential Mechanism

- Sons inherited fathers' occupation after fathers' entry into office.
  - Many local offices were not required to be full-time.
  - No evidence of occupational inheritance. Occupational inheritance
- Local officials have higher prestige and their sons benefit from their fathers' reputation in their jobs.
  - Some evidence that sons with rare surnames are more likely to get employed in the private-sector white-collar jobs. Name recognition
- Sons of local officials are more likely to marry into wealthier families, potentially enhancing their career prospects.
  - No evidence that sons marry into a wealthier family or have a father-in-law working in white-collar jobs. Marriage

back

Occupational Inheritance

	Broad category		Detailed category	
	(1) Same industry	(2) Same occupation	(3) Same industry	(4) Same occupation
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	-0.006	0.005	-0.001	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean	0.408	0.298	0.376	0.260
R^2	0.626	0.555	0.648	0.571
Observations	89690	89690	89690	89690

Back

Reputation Through Name Recognition

	Log Occupational Income		Public-sector		Private-sector White-collar	
	(1) Common	(2) Rare	(3) Common	(4) Rare	(5) Common	(6) Rare
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	0.024^{***}	0.020^{**}	0.014^{***}	0.009^{***}	0.012	0.019^{**}
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean	22.7595	22.9564	0.0207	0.0236	0.2104	0.2209
R^2	0.7129	0.7171	0.4947	0.5229	0.6342	0.6392
Observations	39055	39850	41990	42774	41990	42774

Back

Expanding Marriage Network

Back

	Wife's Father		
	(1) Log occscore	(2) White-collar	(3) Public sector
$\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}$	-0.048	-0.017	-0.001
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.007)
$\text{Office}_{j(i)}$	0.016	0.023*	0.003
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.004)
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y
Pair FE	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Mean	18.788	0.096	0.007
R^2	0.625	0.591	0.579
Observations	8768	9005	8733

Back

Civil Service Adoption and Intergenerational Political Advantages

Back

$$y_{ibct} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \text{Reform}_{j(i)} \times \text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it} + \beta_2(\text{Office}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it}) + \beta_3 \text{Reform}_{j(i)} \times \text{Post}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Post}_{it} + \theta_{bt} + \mu_c + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{ibct}$$

Civil Service Adoption and Intergenerational Political Advantages

Back

	Logged Income Score$_{it}$		Government Job$_{it}$		Private White-collar$_{it}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reform$_{j(i)}$ × Office$_{j(i)}$ × Post$_{it}$	-0.049	-0.048	-0.027	-0.028	0.161**	0.163**
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Office$_{j(i)}$ × Post$_{it}$	0.082	0.081	0.024	0.026	-0.094	-0.097
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Population$_{j(i)}$ × Office$_{j(i)}$ × Post$_{it}$		-0.001		0.001		-0.003**
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Office × Post (Pre-reform)	0.082	0.081	0.024	0.026	-0.094	-0.097
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Office × Post (Post-reform)	0.033	0.033	-0.003	-0.002	0.067**	0.066**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Individual FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age bin FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Mean	29.652	29.652	0.025	0.025	0.398	0.398
R^2	0.711	0.711	0.528	0.529	0.668	0.669

Suggestive Cost of Intergenerational Political Benefits

Back

- Intergenerational political benefits may matter beyond individual families.
- Measure: share of officials' sons employed in the public sector in each locality in 1930.
- Finding: In **smaller** jurisdictions with limited local opportunities, the exposure to intergenerational political benefits is associated with higher inequality.

	Township				City			
	(1) Gini	(2) Gini	(3) Top-10% Share	(4) Top-10% Share	(5) Gini	(6) Gini	(7) Top-10% Share	(8) Top-10% Share
Share of officials' sons in pub (sd)	0.016***		0.013***		-0.001		0.002	
	(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Sons in pub		0.020***		0.020***		-0.007		0.004
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.012)		(0.011)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Mean	0.578	0.578	0.343	0.343	0.455	0.455	0.271	0.271
R^2	0.658	0.658	0.609	0.612	0.618	0.621	0.487	0.487
Observations	469	469	469	469	60	60	60	60

Suggestive Cost of Intergenerational Political Benefits

Back

- Measure: share of officials' sons employed in the public sector in each locality in 1930.

